Bernice Culley v. Garfield Smeltermen\u27s Credit Union et al : Brief of Appellant in Support of Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1965
Bernice Culley v. Garfield Smeltermen's Credit
Union et al : Brief of Appellant in Support of
Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Roy F. Tygesen; Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant;
Mark S. Miner; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent;
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Culley v. Garfield Smeltermen's Credit Union, No. 10247 (Utah Supreme Court, 1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5
IN TH\E SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STAT'E OF ~uTAH 
,BERNICE CULLEY, Executrix o't: a I F I D 
the Estate of VIRGIL J. 'CULrLE:Yt B :.,.,. """"' 
, · deeeased, . . 1AUG 3 (J 1965 . 
• i. Plaintiff and- Respondent, -, _ · '\ I 
vs. --- --- -0~-~-.l:·-,-~~;~-~-~~ e:-~~z-t: -~t~h---· 
GAR FIE, L D S.MELTE~RME·N'S 
CREDIT UNION; S. ~L. LES.T'E·R, 
·-p~esident; GLE,N M. JONE,S, Vice-
President; AL RO·BINSO·N, T'reas- No. 10247 
1 
urer, 
Defeniloots, , UNIVERSITY Cf UT At-t 
vs. 
DOUGLAS K. ~CULLEY, OCT 1 5 1boS 
Interpleading Plaintiff and .; 
Appellant, ·4 LAW LJ~RAR.'( 
No. 10247 \ - , 
'I 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN S,UPPORT OF 
PE·TITION F'OR RE·HEARING 
Appeal from judgment in favor of Plaintiff, holding that 
a joint account in credit union belonged to deceased es-
tate, and not to surviving joint tenant. Judgment entered 
after trial wit4out jury, before the Honorable A. H. 
Ellett, at ~alt Lake City, Utah, in Third Judicial District 
c·ourt, Septemb,er 8, 1964. 
A. H. ELLETT, Judge 
MARK S. MINER 
ROY F. TYGESEN 
2968 So. 8650 West 
Magna, Utah, P.O. Box 206 
297-6711 
Attorney for Interpleading 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
816 Newho~ Building, .· ',)j . , 
Salt Lake C1ty, Utah · · / . · 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
(Case d.jsmissed as to Defendants in lower court) 
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IN TH~~E SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BERNICE CULLEY, Executrix of 
the Estate of VIR;GIL J. ·CULLEY, 
deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GAR F I E L D S.MELTERME·N'S 
CREDIT UNION; S. :L. LES.T'ER, 
President; GLEN M. JONES, Vice-
President; AL RO·BINSON, Treas-
urer, 
Defenda;nts, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS K. ·CULLEY, 
Interpleading Plaintiff and 
Ap;p.ellant, 
No. 102·47 
No. 10247 
APP'ELLANT'S BRIEF IN S·UPPORT OF 
PETITION F:OR REHEARING 
Appeal from judgment in favor of Plaintiff, holding tha.t 
a joint account in credit union belonged to deceased es-
tate, and not to surviving joint tenant. Judgment entered 
after trial without jury, before the Honorable A. H. 
Ellett, at Salt Lake City, Utah, in Third Judicial District 
c·ourt, September 8, 1964. 
A. H. ELLETT, Judge 
MARK S. MINER 
816 Newhouse Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ROY F. TYGESEN 
2968 So. 8650 West 
Magna, Utah, P.O. Box 206 
297-6711 
Attorney for Interpleading 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
(Case dismissed as to Defendants in lower court) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLI~ OF CO~\TENTS 
Page 
DISPOSITION MADE IN LO,VER COURT AND 
THIS COURT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------------------ 1 
STATEMENT 0 F l\1:ATERIAL FACTS ------------------------------------ 1 
i\.RG UlVIENT ____ -- _ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
POINT ONE - WHAT PROOF IS REQUIRED TO 
CONSTITUTE "CLEAR AN D CONVINCING" 
PROOF SUFFICIENT TO VOID A WRITTEN 
INSTRUMENT ? _________ -------------------- ___ ------- ----------------~----------- -~- 7 
POINT TWO-IS THE INTENT OF DONEE ALONE, 
SUFFICIENT TO DETERlVIINE THE INTENT OF 
DONOR, ASSUMING NO INEQUITABLE CON-
DUCT ON PART OF DONEE? -------------------------------------------- 16 
POINT THREE- DOES THE PROVISION FOR SUR-
VIVORSHIP, COUPLED WITH THE FACT DONEE 
DID NOT, AND HAD NO INTENTION TO USE 
THE .ACCOUNT DURING LIFETIME OF DONOR, 
VIOLATE THE STATUTE OF WILLS, AND VOID 
THE JOINT AGREEMENT? ---------------------------------------------- 19 
POINT FOUR - WHERE FACTS ARE UNDIS-
PUTED, IS THERE A DUTY ON THE PART OF 
THIS COURT TO l\iAKE ITS OWN FINDINGS OF 
FACT? ----------------------------------------------------- ------------··········----------- 23 
POINT FIVE - THIS DECISION IS IN DIRECT 
CONFLICT WITI-I THE LEGISLATURE INTENT 
AS EXPRESSED IN 7-13-39 U.C.A. 1953 (Supp. 
1961); AND LONG ESTABLISHED BUSINESS 
PRACTICE. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 26 
POINT SIX - UNDER THE HOLDING IN THIS 
CASE, ALMOST EVERY CREDIT UNION AC-
COUNT IS vu-~NERABLE. ------------------------------------------------ 27 
CASES CITED 
Statutes- 7-13-39 U.C.A. 1953 (Supp. 1961) ---------------------------- 22 
Braegger vs Loveland - 12 Utah Second 384 -
367 Pacific Second 177 -------------------------------------------------------- 13 
First Security vs Demeris- 10 Utah Second 405-
354 Pacific Second 97 -----------------------------------------··················· 10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Greener vs Greener - 116 Utah 571 - 212 Pacific 
Second 194 _____ . -------------------------------------------------------------------- ____ 9 
Hayward vs Gill - 16 Utah Second 299 - 400 
Pacific Second 16 -----------------------------------··········----------·····-······· 14 
Holt vs Bayless - 85 Utah 364- 39 Pacific Second 715 ________ 7 
Neil vs Royce - 101 Utah 181 - 12 OPacific Second 327 ...... 8 
0. A. Tangren vs Adaline M. Ingalls- 12 Utah 
Second 388 - 367 Pacific Second 179 ----------------·····--·····--·· 12 
Wood vs Kintner- 86 Utah 279 - 43 Pacific Second 192 .... 8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
iN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF U'TAH 
BERNI·CE CULLEY, Executrix of 
the Estate of VIRGIL J. CULLEY, 
deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GAR F I E L D SMELTERMEN'S 
CREDIT UNION; S. L. LEST·ER, 
Ptesident; GLEN l\I. l'JONES, Vice-
President; AL RO·BINS·ON, T·reas-
urer, 
Defendants, 
' vs. 
DOUGLAS K. CULLEY, 
Interpleading Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
No. 10247 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the above named DOUGLAS K. CUL-
LEY, Appellant and inter-Pleading Plaintiff, and P'eti-
tions the Court for a rehearing in the above entitled 
Inatter, and in support thereof, represents that this ·Court 
erred, in the following: 
1. The lower Court held that (A) "That at no tiine 
did Virgil J. ·Culley (Deceased) intend that. Douglas 
Culley was to have said account or any part thereof 
during the life time of Virgil J. Culley and that Virgil 
J. Culley never intended to make a gift of the rnoney 
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during his life tin1e to Douglas K. CullP~~, thP intPr-
Pleading Plaintiff"; That there was no joint tenane~· 
intended and no joint tenancy created by reason of the 
joint share agreement; (B) The joint share agree1nent 
\Vas signed as a substitute for a will. 
In its conclusions of la\v, the lower Court held that 
the joint share agreement was a testamentary device and 
as such violates the statutes of \Vilis. 
This 'Court confirms those findings, and that it was 
a testamentary disposition. 
Since every joint account provides for survivor~ 
ship, then under this Courts decision, every joint ac-
count is void. 
2. The principal that a presumption exists in favor 
of the validity of the joint share agreement, that can 
be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence, is 
entirely abandoned under the present decision. 
3. The Court points out that the failure of appel-
lant to exercise control over the account in the lifetime 
of his father, nor to \vithdra\v or deposit to the .Account, 
is the type of proof necessary to support that Findings 
of the lower Court that the joint share agreement is 
void. This reverses for1ner rulings of this Court, where-
in this Court held that a \vithdrawal was an indication 
of the opposite intent. 
4. This decision in effects hold (A) \vhere no con-
trol is exercised; (B) Where surviving joint owner had 
no intt>nt to control the account in the lifetime of deposi-
tor ; · ('C) there \vas no intent on the part of depositor 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to create a joint account, by reason of the conduct of 
survivor. In other 'vords, the conduct of survivor. In 
other vvords, the conduct of survivor determines the 
intent of depositor. 
5. The foregoing facts apply to practically every 
such account, and 'Yould 111ake every joint account 
vunerable to attack. 
6. The present decision in effects voids the joint 
account practice used in business over a long period of 
time. 
7. This decision opens the field to voluminous liti-
gations and probate proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted August 16, 1965. 
Roy F. Tygesen - Attorney for 
Petitioner and Appellant Douglas K. Culley. 
29·68 South 8650 West, 1lagna, l itah 
P. 0. Box 206- Dial 297-6711 
I certify thata a true and correct copy of the fore-
going was mailed to MARK S. ~fiNER., Attorney at 
Law, 816 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
August 16, 1965. 
Roy F. Tygesen 
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iN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
B~~RNICE ClTLI~EY, Executrix of 
the Estate of '{IRGIL J. CULLEY, 
deceased, 
Plaintiff aJZd Respondent, 
vs. 
GAR F I E L D SMELTERMEN'S 
CREDIT tJNION; S. L. LEST·ER, 
President; GJ__JEN 1vL JONES, Vice-
President; AL R.O·BINSON, Treas-
urer, 
Defendants, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS I{. CULLEY, 
Interpleading Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
No. 10247 
No. 10247 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
DISPOSITION MADE IN LO\VER COuRT AND 
BY THIS ·COURT ON APPEAL. 
Appellant's original brief set out disposition in 
lo,ver Court, and this ·Court affirrned; This petition for 
rehearing by Douglas K. Culley, Appellant follows. 
STATEMENT OF i\IATERIAL FACT~S 
This rnatter involves the deceased father, VIRGIL 
J. CLTLLEY; BERNI'CE CULLEY; the surviving wife 
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and Executrix of his Estate~, Plaintiff and R.Pspondt•nt 
herein; THE GARFIEI_JD S}.TEijTER.:JIEN'N CHJ<~DI1, 
lJNION, defendant in the action; and DOUGLAS K. 
C-ULLEY, surviving joint o\vner of the account, the 
Interpleading Plaintiff, Appellant, and petitioner for 
rehearing. For the sake of brevity, ·riRGIL J. ClTL-
LEY, \vill be referred to as "the Father''; BERNICE 
CULLEY, as '•Stepmother" and the (}ARFIELD 
SMELTERMEN'S C RED I T UNION, as "'Credit 
Union"; and DOl--:-GLAS K. CUL,LEY as "the son." 
In 19·60, the father, was a vvidovver, his -vvife having 
died, leaving four sons and a daughter, all of whom 
were minors, except Douglas, the oldest son, who was 
1narried and maintained his own home in Magna, Utah. 
At the time the account \Yas created, the three 
brothers lived \vith hin1, and the sister lived with her 
maternal grandparents. The father lived separate and 
apart from the fan1ily, and contributed practically noth-
ing to their support. 
The joint account was set up ~larch 10, 1960. At 
the time, and up to his death, the father \Yas employed 
by the Smelter as foreman, and had been a member of 
the Credit Union for years. 
The father had an account ,,~i th the credit union. 
He obtained from the credit union their for1n entitled 
HJOIN·T SHARE A·C'COlTNT _A_GR.EE~IENT," \Yent to 
thP holnP of the son, both signed the agreen1ent, and 
thP fath(_1 l' delivPred the agree1nent to the Credit l~nion, 
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3 
·where it remained unchanged, until deposited 'vith the 
Court. 
The agreement was in usual for1n, prepared by the 
Credit Union, providing (1) joint o\vnership with right 
of survivorship, (2) right of either party to deposit or 
"rithdraw, (3) and giving the Credit Union the right, 
·with immunity frorn claim, to pay to either joint owner 
or the survivor. 
The father remarried, Bernice :c·ulley, sorne two 
years prior to his death, October 10, 19·63. 
On September 21, 1963, the father made a will, less 
than a month before his death, giving his entire estate 
to the step rnother, and specifically giving his children 
nothing. The Will made no. mention of the saving ac-
count with the ·Credit Union. 
There were no children issue of the second marriage. 
Under the lower Court decision, the savings account 
was a\varded to the estate, and of course under the Will, 
would go to the stepn1other. 
From the time of setting up the joint account till 
shortly before his death, the father made deposits and 
withdrawals from the savings account. 
Douglas K. Culley, the son, never 1nade a deposit 
or withdrawal, and in no way exercised control of the 
account. 
The father repeatedly discussed the account with 
the son, and on one occasion said, He (the son) was to 
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see that the boys \Vere provided and taken care~ of'' 
(Respondents brief page 5-6-7). 
The step-mother stated that the father repeatedly 
promised her he would change the account, and 1nade a 
trip to the Smelter to do so. 
He never changed the account. 
After the fathers death, the step-n1other instituted 
probate proceedings and instituted this action, as Execu-
trix of his estate. 
The ·Credit Union deposited the savings account into 
Court, together with copies of their records. 
There vvere extended pleading, motions, and orders, 
but finally the ~c·ourt made his "Findings of Fact" that 
there was no joint tenancy, there was no intent to create 
a joint tenancy, and the joint share agreement was 
signed and made for the sole purpose of being used as 
a substitute for a will. 
Further, under the undisputed testi1nony of Doug-
las K. 'Culley, the joint share agree1nent violates the 
statute of wills, and was an attempted testa1nentary 
devise. 
In its conclusions, the Court ruled that the joint 
share agreement was an attempted testamentary devise 
and as such violates the statute of wills. 
The Conclusions makes no reference as to the ques-
tion of ''intent," ['The decree a\\·arded the $1,540.14, de-
])Osited \vith the Court, to be paid over to the Executrix, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
together with the title to a pontiac automobile and a 
trailer.] 
This appeal followed, and this Court affirined the 
lower ·c·ourt. 
[The foregoing facts are undisputed. 
The lower ·Court, and this Court based its decision 
entirely on the testimony of the son. 
There was no evidence of fraud, Inistake, undue in-
fluence; nor \Vas there any evidence presented of in-
equitable conduct on the part of the son. 
This Court in its opinion stated: "It is to be kept 
in n1ind that if the transfer of ownership of this ac-
count, if any there was, was intended to vest only upon 
the father's death, that \Yould be an attempted testamen-
tary disposition, which did not conform to the requisites 
for a \Yill, and would therefor be invalid to transfer 
ownership as the trial Court ruled. 
The Court quotes from Judge ·Cordozo quoting from 
a former decision. The Court failed to add further state-
ment of ·Cordozo, that "This presumption, injected by 
Courts of equity since ancient times, continues and can 
be overcome by the intervener only by clear and con-
vincing proof to the contrary" (Tangren case - 1 >agP 
181). The Court then said "The critical question con-
fronted here is whether the trial Court's finding that 
the parties did not intend the son Douglas to own any 
interest in the account prior to the father's death i~ 
supported by that degree of proof."] 
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[To sustain this findings of the lo\vc~r Court, thi:-; 
Court recites (1) The father established the account, (:~) 
1nade all deposits and \vithdrR\\yals, (3) Douglas the son, 
made no deposits or withdra\vals, ( -i-) The son 1nakes 
no claim that his money \vent into the account, ( 5) Aft<~r 
quoting from the son's testimony, this ·Court concluded 
the foregoing was sufficient to overcome presu1nption 
of validity of written agreement, by clear and convinc-
ing proof. And finally the Court said they 1nust favor 
the lower Courts findings, and proceeded to affirm. 
In support of our petition for rehearing, these 
points should be reconsidered: 
1. What proof is required to constitute ~'·C·LE.AR 
AND CONVINCING P'R.OOF," sufficient to void a writ-
ten instrument~ 
2. Is the intent of donee, under joint share agree-
nlent, alone, sufficient to determine the intent of Donor, 
assuming no inequitable conduct on the part of donee~ 
3. Does the provision for survivorship, coupled 
\vith the fact that donee did not, and had no intention 
of using the account, during Donor's lifetime, violate the 
statute of wills, and void the joint share agreement~ 
4. Is there a responsibility on this ·Court, ·where 
facts are undisputed, to make its o\vn "findings of fact'' 
pointing out the basis for the same. 
5. This decision goes in direct conflict \vith long 
established business practice, and in conflict \vth legis-
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lative directive (7-13-39) that the opening of an account, 
as outlined, shall be "CONCL USI\TE." 
6. Practically every credit union account comes 
\rithin the province of this case, and opens the door to 
litigation. 
POINT ONE 
WHAT PROOF IS REQUIRED TO CONSTITUTE 
"CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF," SUFFICIENT 
TO VOID A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT? 
The definitions we have found of this type of proof, 
"\Vere not too helpful, and so, \Ve propose a revie\v of 
some of the joint aecount cases, decided by this ·C·ourt, 
in an atte1npt to see "That constituted CLEAR AND 
CONVIN·CING PROOF. 
HOLT VS. BA Y·LESS, 85 Utah 364, 39 Pacific 
Second 715. Decided December 28, 193-4. 
In this case, donor made all deposits, donee made no 
"\vithdrawals or deposits, donee said "It was Aunt Em-
ma's money" and donee thought she was to get Inoney 
when "Aunt Emma died." There was a subsequent will 
by donor, with no mention of account. Till the Tangren 
case, this was considered the law. 
The donee did not exercise control, nor did she in-
tend to until after death of donor. 
The facts are identical with our case, but the Court 
said the evidence did not meet the requi reinent of clear 
and convincing proof. 
The trust agreement was sustained. Under our case, 
it \vould have been reversed. 
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The intent of donee, nor the question of testaniPl1-
tary disposition, \vas not discussed. 
Lawyers, basing their advice on that decision would 
have been on reasonably safe ground, in advising joint 
savings account, in lieu of wills. 
The ·Court made extensive report of facts, and the 
reason for its findings. 
WOOD VS. KIN·TNER, 86 Utah 279, 43 Pacific 
Second 192. Decided April 5, 1935. 
In this case, fraud was claimed. The donor created 
the account, furnished all they money, the donee \vas a 
friend, not a relative, she deposited nothing, withdrew 
nothing, exercised no control. 
The Court, after extensive review of the facts, found 
the burden was not met, and approved the joint account 
in survivor. This case likewise would have come into the 
preview of our case and been reversed. 
NEIL \TS. ROYCE, 101 Utah 181, 120 Pacific 
Second 327. Decided December 29, 19·41. 
Here both parties \Yere alive. The money belonged 
to husband. Wife made no deposits. Husband gave wife 
account book, and she said, "I won't touch it." Claim 
\Vas that the account vvas set up to avoid probate. This 
is the nearest the Court previously considered an at-
teinpted testamentary disposition, but did not consider 
it in that light, as effecting their decision. 
In discussing ~'clear and sufficient proof" the 'Court 
at page 331, said, "The only evidence refuting the im-
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plied joint savings account in the instant case was that 
of the testin1ony of the co-depositors to the effect that 
their purpose in establishing the joint savings account 
,yas to take advantage of the survivorship provision, and 
that the money was intended to be the sole and separate 
property of the intervenor. Such proof under the cir-
cumstances of this case cannot be ter1ned so clear and 
convincing as to require the trial court to find in favor 
of appellant. To say that it was sufficient would throw 
open the door to fraud and colusion as between co-
depositors and third parties. This equity will not do." 
Here, both parties to the trust account said it was 
the propPrty of husband, that the wife did not intend to 
touch it, and that it was Inade only for the purpose of 
avoiding probate. 
Under our case, this one would have been reversed 
both as to intent, and by reason by an attempted testa-
Inentary disposition. The written agreement was sus-
tained. 
GREENER VS. G-REENER, 116 Utah 571, 212 
Pacific Second 194. Decided December 2, 
1949. 
In this case the 1noney belonged to husband. They 
made a tour of savings account institutions, and chang-<·d 
the accounts to both thej r na1nes. They separated and 
then effected a reconciliation. Again they signed j.oint 
account cards. The husband withdrew 20,000.00 and put 
it in his sons name. She then sued for divorcP and 
claimed half of these joint accountH. 
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Here the Court sustained the lo\ver ·Court in its find-
ings there was no intent to creatP a joint account, and 
here was a very substantial reason, he withdrew all the 
Inoney and closed the account. 
Had the father done so in our case, this case would 
never have been instituted. 
The fact that the father did not vvithdra\v the Inonp:,·, 
nor change the account card, \vould be an indication or 
evidence of his intent in setting up the account. 
The lower Court held that there was clear and con-
vincing proof against presumption of joint tenancy, and 
that the account 'vas created to avoid probate. The lower 
Court made an extensive memorandum to support these 
findings. This Court spent ten pages reviewing the evi-
dence and the findings and memorandum of the lower 
c·ourt, before agreeing there was clear and convincing 
evidence to set aside the written documents. They did 
not include as their reason that it was an attempted 
testamentary disposition. 
This case indicates the care taken to review the 
facts before holding a written agreement would be set 
aside. 
The striking point in this case is that the husband 
\\·ithdrew all the money in his lifetime. A pretty strong 
indication of his intent. 
FIRST S·ECl1RITY BANK OF UTAH, as EXE-
~c·UTOR VS. DE~1IRIS, 10 Utah Second 405, 
354 Pacific Second 97. Decided July 7, 1960. 
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In this case, the monies were property of husband. 
lie had purchased bonds in the name of him and wife, 
and opened savings accounts in his name and that of 
his wife. These were of long standing. They had been 
1narried 31 years but estranged over the last fifteen 
years. Husband \Yas ill with cancer, and a month and 
one half before his death, he changed his own account 
by adding the wife's name. She immediately withdrew 
the 1noney in all the accounts and put it in her name. 
The husband made a will giving his brothers a sub-
stantial share of his estate. The lower 'Court ruled the 
bonds and the long standing joint accounts went to the 
wife, because of the time element. The recent account 
did not, because that was not his intent. This Court 
supported that decision, indicating that the account was 
set up for convenience because of illness, and her im-
Inediate withdrawal indicated her intent when she signed 
the card. 
There was pretty strong evidence as to both of their 
intentions in setting up the last account. It is interesting 
to note, that they did not similarly rule as to the old 
accounts and the bonds. 
Judge Crockett, at page 99, said in relation to the 
v¥ife, withdrawing the account." Looking at the matter 
through the eyes of equity it seems undisputable that 
Defendant's act of grabbing the money at the earliest 
opportunity was for the purpose of getting it for herself 
and excluding the cotenant therefrom; and that this was 
a 'vrongful act which should not be rewarded." 
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I insert the above as an indication of the Courts 
position, before overturning the joint account. 
Even then, the Court did not change the written 
instrument so far as the old accounts and bonds ·were 
concerned. 
In our case, the son exercised no control and Inade 
no withdrawals, which indicated his intent as to the ae-
count: In the Demiris case, the withdrawal indicated 
her intent not to create a joint account. 
Would Ellett's ruling had been different if the son 
had exercised control, and drawn out all the money in 
the account~ 
0. A. 'TANGREN VS. ADALINE M. INGALLS, 
12 Utah Second 388, 367 Pacific Second 179. 
Decided November 30, 1961. 
This case of course set up the proposition that the 
intent in creating the account, was controlling. 
It does not pinpoint ''Those intent, Donor, or donee, 
but it did require donor, "\Vho desired to set aside written 
instrument, to show his intent by clear and convincing 
proof. 
Donor had two building and loan accounts in his 
own name. Ten months prior to his death, he included 
Donee's name on accounts. During his lifetime he in-
stituted suit to have accounts declared his o\vn, but died 
five days after suit filed, and his Executor took over, 
clai1ning ( 1) Money all Donor's, ( 2) Donee contributed 
nothing to the account, ( 3) Donor \vas not indebted to 
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Donee; ( 4) Donor later gave Donee $4,000.00 as her 
share of his estate, ( 5) Donor vvas not R\vare of \vhat he 
vvas doing in signing the joint account card. 
Judge Faux ruled in lo\ver Court by way of surn-
Inary judgment, that the joint account should stand. 
This ·Court said Donor should have had the oppor-
tunity to present evidence in support of the above points, 
and by inference indicated that if clear and convincing 
proof were given, the vvritten agreement could be voided. 
A major factor in his case, going to show intent of 
donor \vas the giving of $4,000.00 as Donee's share of 
his estate. 
Another major point was that in his lifetime, Donor 
filed suit to set aside account. 
Neither of these points are present in our case. 
BRAEGGER VS. LOVELAND, 12 Utah Seeond 
384, 367 Pacific Second 177. Decided Decem-
ber 1, 19·61. 
Donor was a bachelor, seventy years of age and 
suffering from cancer. He had a bank account of $45,-
000.00. Two months before his death he put his sisters 
name on the account. Before his death she withdrew the 
1noney and put it in her own account. His Administrator 
claimed the account. The lower Court gave each one-half. 
This Court sustained the validity of the account, 
saying her withdrawal of the account during donor's 
lifetjme was practically the only fact the Administrator 
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could point to, to upset the joint account. This Court 
said this was not enough. 
The Court did review the evidence and make its 
own findings. 
This case does hold that a withdrawal by one 
joint tenant does not autoinatically destroy the joint 
tenancy. Does the fact that Donee neither exercised 
control, nor intended to, constitute clear and convincing 
evidence sufficient to set aside the 'vritten instrument ·j? 
This case is strong authority for the proposition, 
that "The burden was not upon the Defendant to 1nake 
an affirmative sho,ving of such intent. As the survivor 
she was presumed to be the owner and the burden of 
attacking her ownership was upon the Plaintiff Ad-
Ininistrator." 
In support of its own "findings" the ·Court points 
out, affection between brother and sister, her care of 
deceased, and his expression to another, the account 
'.vould go to the Donee. 
All these elements are present in our case, father 
and son relationship, the son caring for father's chil-
dren, the father expressing his desire that "the boys be 
taken care of." 
HAYWARD 'TS. GII~L, 16 Utah Second 299, 400 
P'acific Second 16. Decided ~larch 18, 1H65. 
In this case a daughter moved in and cared for her 
father '.vhen he \\?as 82 years of age. He died five years 
later. He went to lawyer and had dee dra"\vn in favor of 
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danghtL~r, reserving life estate, and placed daughters 
na1ne on 1,350.00 account. 
Jiis estate clain1ed the account and attempted to void 
the deed. 
She never contributed to the account, exercised no 
control, the father in five year period never changed the 
account or expressed dissatisfaction. 
,Judge Hanson dismissed Plaintiffs complaint. This 
Court after reviewing the evidence confirmed this action. 
11he Court said that the fact the daughter did not 
contribute "any money in this account is not of con-
trolling significance." Here again the Court said the 
Plaintiff had the burden of proof. There was no men-
tion of Donee's intent. 
There was nothing said about an attempted testa-
lllentary disvositio_n. Here again the Court made its own 
findings. 
Similarity to our case, are father and son relation, 
the son caring for minor children, no dissatisfaction or 
change in the account in three years, no deposits, with-
dra\\'al or control by donee. 
Under Judge Elletts ruling, this case would have 
been decided in favor of the estate. 
From the foregoing review of ea~<~~, this ~lutunarv 
seems fair; In sjx of these eight casPs, 01P (~on rt sus-
tained thP written instrument. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
In the De1niris case th(~ Court sustained the agT('<'-
rnent as to the old accounts. 
In the Den1iris case the ·Court found the joint at-
count -vvould not stand up as to the' ne\\T account hPean~:w 
of illness of Donor, her intention indicated llv iillllH'cli-
ate withdrawal of the account, and the conduct of donpe 
being inequitable. 
The Court did support the agree1nent as to the old 
accounts. 
The Greene case was one where the account was 
not sustained. 
The Court pointed out marital difficulties, that he 
withdrew all the monies in his lifetime. 
We sub1nit that none of the elements for voiding 
the agreement given in the Demiris or Greene case are 
present in our case. Not one of the foregoing cases went 
into the question of an attempted testamentary devise. 
In each and every case this Court carefully set out 
its own reasons for its conclusions, and nowhere is there 
indicated that the lower Court ruling should be given 
controlling consideration. 
POINT TWO 
IS THE INTENT OF DONEE ALONE, SUFFI-
CIENT TO DETERMINE THE INTENT OF DONOR, 
ASSUMING NO INEQUITABLE CONDUCT ON 
PART OF DONOR? 
We point out to the c·ourt that Judge Elletts ruling 
as to intent is based exclusively on the testimony of 
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Donl\e, and the opinion is this case says: "On the basis 
of ·Clai1nant's own testiinony it seems incontestable that 
the trial court could reasonably find as it did, that 
neither he nor his father intended that he should have 
an interest in this bank account \vhile his father lived." 
Tht\re is not one statement in this record from the 
fath( 1 l' hirnself indicating his negative intent. 
vV e do not dispute the Courts findings that the son 
had no intention of exercising control during the fathers 
lifetime. 
\Ve do raise this question, can that fact alone, with-
out a single inequitable act on the part of the son, destroy 
the written contract~ 
If we get our feet back on the ground, we will face 
the fact, that a very substantial amount of savings ac-
counts held in joint tenancy, are set up under exactly 
the facts of this case. 
This Court quotes the sons staternent to establish 
the sons intent, and then attributes that to <lstablish thP 
fathers intent. 
We contend that since it was the fath<·rs InonPy, it 
was his acts that created the account, it should hP hi::; 
clear intent that should govern, and the clear edi<'t < )f 
the written agreement should be carri<·d out. 
The intent of donee should be given weight only 
·when it is accompanied h,v inequitable conduct on the 
part of donee, as Judge Crockett pointPd out in t hP 
Demiris case. 
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In the Holt vs. Bayl~ss case the Court said "ThP 
controlling question is whether THE P'ERSO·N O·PEN-
ING THE A'CiCOUNT intentionally and intelligently 
created a condition embracing the essPntial ele1nents of 
joint ownership and survivorship." 
In the Neil vs. Royce case, when the \vife was given 
the account book, she said "I "\\rill never touch th<~ ac-
count." She never did. Yet the Court sustained the 
agreement. 
In the Greene case at page 199, the Court said "The 
most widely accepted view is that the property passes 
as a gift inter vivos provided there is a donative in-
tent ... " 
In making a gift, does not the intent of donor con-
trol~ 
If A makes a gift to B, who in turns thro,vs it in the 
garbage can, does than void the gift to B ~ 
The facts in this case to show the fathers intent are 
that, ( 1) he picked up the card, ( 2) he asked the son to 
sign, (3) he had been a mernber of the credit union a 
long time, he could read and write, and presumably knew 
what he \Vas doing, ( 4) he delivered the card to the 
credit union, ('5) he never changed the card, (6) his wife 
asked that he change the card, but he never did, and (7) 
he said he wan ted "the boys provided and taken care of." 
Now, the lo,ver Court and this Court says he did not 
intend what the card said, ''The joint o'vners of this 
account hereby agree with each other and 'vith said credit 
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union that all sums no\v paid on shares, or heretofore 
or hereafter paid in on shares by any or all of said joint 
O\\·ners to their credit as such joint o-vvners with all ac-
curnulations thereon, are and shall be owned by them 
jointly, -vvith right of survivorship and be subject to the 
\\·ithdra\val or receipt of any of thern, and payment to 
any of thern or the survivor or survivors shall be 
I'd " va 1 ... 
\Ve submit, the father intended to do exactly \vhat 
that card said, and the sons intentions as to what he 
\rould do with the right so besto,\·ed, should not void 
that \vritten contract. 
POINT THREE 
DOES THE PROVISION FOR SURVIVORSHIP, 
COUPLED WITH THE FACT THAT DONEE DID 
NOT, AND HAD NO INTENTION TO USE THE 
ACCOUNT, DURING THE LIFETIME OF DONOR, 
VIOLATE THE STATUTE OF WILLS, AND VOID 
THE JOINT SHARE AGREEMENT? 
Admittedly this is a new point injected into the 
already confused status of joint accounts. 
None of the cases reviewed above, considered thi~ 
point, or determined the point. 
In the present case Judge Ellett in his "findings" 
(8) "The Court further finds as a fact that there was 
no joint tenancy created between Douglas K. Culle~r and 
Virgil J. ·Culley by reason of the joint share agree1nent 
and that said joint shan~ agreement was signed and 
1nade for the sole purpose of being used as a substitute 
for a will." 
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( 9) "The Court further finds and the evidence 
conclusively shows that the joint share agreement was 
established by Douglas K. Culley and \'"irgil ~J. Culley 
for the sole purpose and "rith the intention that Douglas 
K. Culley, as the survivor, should have the remaining 
balance at the tirne of \Tirgil J. Culleys death." 
(10) "The ·Court finds as a fact that the joint share 
agreement violates the statute of \Vilis and that under 
the undisputed testimony of Douglas K. Culley the joint 
share agreement WaS established by \Tirgil J. c·ulley and 
Douglas K. Culley as a testamentary devise." 
The lower Courts conclusions : ( 1) "That the joint 
share agreement which was made and entered into by 
Douglas K. Culley and Virgil J. Culley on March 10, 
1960, was an attempted testamentary devise and as such 
violates the statute of wills.'' 
Incidently, there \Yas not once 1nentioned in the trial 
anything about \Vilis. Does the review by this Court 
sho\v there was clear and convincing evidence as to this 
"finding"~ 
The lower ·C·ourts conclusions of la\Y are limited to 
( 1) above as to its being an atten1pted testamentary de-
vise. There are no conclusions as to intent. 
The decree is based on these findings and conclu-
sions, and 1nakes no reference to either intent or at-
teulpted will. 
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Does Judge Ellt1tt base his decision exclusively on 
the findings and conclusions, as to a testamentary de-
vise~ 
This Court, in approving of Judge Ellets decision 
said, "It is to be kept in mind that if the transfer of 
ownership of this account, if any there was, was in-
tended to vest only upon the father's death, that would 
be an attempted testa1nentary disposition which did not 
conform to the requisites for a will, and would therefor 
be invalid to transfer ownership as the trial Court ruled." 
Again, '~The critical question confronted here is 
''Thether the trial ·Court's finding that the parties did 
not intend the son Douglas to o'vn any interest in the 
account prior to the father's death is supported by that 
degree of proof." 
This Court then quotes from Respondent's brief as 
to testimony of the son, and based on that excerpt, said, 
"On the basis of Claimant's own testimony it seems 
incontestable that the trial Court could reasonably find 
as it did, that neither he nor his father intended that hP 
should have any interest in this bank account while his 
father lived." 
Every joint account card I have ever read, provides 
for survivorship. Now we have in this case, the situation 
of testamentary devise, as an additional factor for the 
Courts to consider, in arriving at the intent of the cre-
ator of the account, so as to determine if the written 
agreement shall be set aside by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
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Every bank, building and loan association and credit 
union, prepares cards for their depositors with ahnost 
identical provisions. They urge, and alrnost insist that 
their depositors have another nan1e on the card, to avoid 
probate, and facilitate payment. 
This Courts ruling in this case stands for the propo-
sition, that if the donee, not donor, had no intention to 
exercise control over the account until death of donor, 
then the joint share agreement is void. 
Does that not end the matter~ 
What does injecting the question of testamentary 
disposition into the case, do other than add to the con-
fusion~ 
7-13-39 U.C.A. 1953 ( Supp. 1961) provides, after 
setting out how the account shall be set up, "The open-
ing of the account IN SUCH FORM shall in the absence 
of fraud, or undue influence, be CONC'LUSIVE EVI-
DENCE in any action or proceedings to which either 
the association or the surviving party or parties is a 
party, of the intention of all the parties to the account 
to vest to such account and the additions thereto in such 
survivor or survivors.'' 
Does a decision by Judge Ellett and by this Court 
deter1nining that the joint share agreement was not 
drawn "in such forn1'' do away with the intent of the 
legislature as above set out. 
Is the provision of this statute contingent on the 
joint share agree1nent being found by the ·Court to be 
proper in form 1 
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Assu1ning the Credit Union had paid over to the 
son the rnoney in the account, and the ·Court finds that 
the agreernent was void, is the credit union liable to the 
l~~tate for paying out on a agreement the Court declared 
void~ 
It \vould seem to Appellant, that inserting the mat-
ter of an attempted testamentary disposition, only adds 
to the confusion presently existing in relation to joint 
savings accounts. 
POINT FOUR 
WHERE FACTS ARE DISPUTED., IS THERE A 
DUTY OF THE PART OF THIS COURT TO MAKE 
ITS OWN FINDINGS OF FACT? 
This Court in its opinion said, "We recognize that 
fron1 the recital of joint ovvnership with the right of 
survivorship there arises a presumption that such is 
the fact. But it is, of course, not absolute and invuner-
able to attack. This is true even of deeds and other 
\Vritten instruments." 
"On the basis of Claimant's own testimony it seems 
incontestable that the trial court could REASONABLY 
find as it did, that neither he nor his father intended 
that he should have any interest in this bank account 
\vhile his father lived. AS IN OTHER MATTERS O·F 
PROOF, WHETHER THE EVIDEN·CE IS SUFFI-
CIENT TO MEET THE NECESSARY REQUli{.E-
~IENTS OF BEING CI~EAR AND CONVINCINU IS 
LARGELY FOR THE TRIAL ·COUR.T TO DETER.-
~IIXE BECAUSE OF HIS ADVANTAGED P'OSI-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
TION. UNDER THE TRADITIONAL RT~IjES OF Rg_ 
VIEW, WHICH REQUIRES US TO SlTR,TEY THE 
EVIDENCE AND ALL REASONABLE INFER-
ENCES TO BE DRAWN THEREFROM IN THE 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE T·RIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS, WE ·CAN SEE NO BASIS FOR 
REVERSING THE JUDGMENT." 
In our case there is no conflict in the evidence. 
In all the cases referred to above this ·Court in re-
view has extensively reviewed the lower Courts findings 
as to clear and convincing proof, whether they affirmed 
or reversed. 
There is no basis for the lower Courts findings as 
to the fathers intent, except the testimony of the son. 
There was no pleadings, no evidence, for the lower 
Courts findings and conclusions as to testamentary dis-
position. 
Should not this ·Court have made its own determina-
tion as to the fathers intent, as indicated by the decision 
in the Greene case, at page 202, "There are cases in 
,,~hich we may be equally as good a position as the trial 
court to make the inferences from what are usually called 
basic, evidenciary, or under lying facts. 
For instance where all the evidence is documentary . 
. . . "Or where there are no issues concerning it in which 
the creditability of the witness could play a part .. · · 
W <-' ''Tould be in as good a position as the trial Court 
to 1nal\:e inferences and deductions from the evidence." 
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.J..t\.gain in the De1niris case at page 99, this Court 
said, ""It is our prerogative and DUTY under the con-
~titution to revie\v the evidence in equity cases and to 
1nodify or rnake ne\v findings if the record compels it." 
This is the case \\"here Judge Ellett, sitting as a 
1nernber of the Court. dissented, and spent substantial 
tin1e supporting his position at (Page 104) '~I am ap-
posed to this Court becorning a trier of facts. It should 
confine its efforts to a revie\Y of the alleged errors of 
la,,· and to a passing upon facts in equity cases only 
\vhen it is in the same position as is the district Court 
judge, viz., ,,,.hen the facts are established by docunlen-
tary evidence only." 
Did this ·Court lend too rnuch \\·eight to the lo\ver 
Courts findings, rather than makes its own determina-
tion~ 
In our case the joint agreement is docurnentary, the 
exhibits deposited by the credit union are docurnentary, 
the \vill is documentary, the testimony of the son is un-
disputed, his creditability is certainly not in issue, since 
he testified to his own disadvantage. 
We subrnit, the Court should start \vi.th a clean shPPt, 
and from the record, make its own determjnation as to 
"clear ond convincing proof," rather than exa1nining th<' 
facts "in a light most favorable to the trial Court's find-
ings." 
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POINT FIVE 
THIS DECISION IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT 
WITH THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS EXPRESSED 
IN 7-13-39 U.C.A. (Supp. 1961), AND LONG ESTAB-
LISHED BUSINESS PRACTICE. 
As heretofore stated, the joint account cards used 
by banks, building and loan associations, credit unions, 
and other saving institutions are almost identical, and 
prepared meticulously by their legal advisers. 
Every one of these urge their depositors to add an 
additional name to their account. 
For years I have advised and urged clients to 1nake 
these joint accounts, "\\7ith provision for survivorship, 
make joint tenancy deeds, putting stocks and bonds in 
joint names, with right of survivorship, and also advis-
ing that then no probate is necessary, nor is a will 
required. 
If I interpret the Courts decision correctly, after 
the death of the donor of the account, if his estate can 
show that the donee did not intend to exercise control 
over the account, till after the donors death, the joint 
account is void, and they money goes to the estate, re-
sulting in probate. 
I submit that each member of this Court is fully 
aware of the business practice of adding a name to an 
account, with the absolute intention (1) for donor tore-
tain control during life, (2) to provide for the funds 
being available in e1nergency or illness; and finally (3) 
the fund go to donee on death, \Vi thout the expense of 
probate. 
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This I subn1it is do\vn to earth actual business prac-
tic e. 
This decision puts an end to that practice. 
As legal advisor to a savings institution, could he 
advise the bank to pay to the survivor, on the basis that 
the statute quoted heretofore would protect the bank. 
Would not his advice be more in keeping with this 
decision if he said "Deposit it with the ·Court, and let 
the heirs and survivor, fight it out." 
POINT SIX 
UNDER THE HOLDING IN THIS CASE, AL-
M 0 S T EVERY CREDIT UNION ACCOUNT IS 
VUNERABLE. 
Limiting our discussion to the Garfield Smelter-
Inen's Credit Union. There are in excess of one thousand 
employees at the smelter. A substantial majority of 
these belong to the credit union. All are urged to take 
home a card and have a wife, brother, son, daughter, 
parent, friend or relative sign. 
Membership in the credit union by state law and the 
credit union by-la-vvs limit membership to employees. 
Practically every account makes deposits by payroll 
deduction. 
The donor, not the donee makes this arrangernent 
for payroll payment. 
The credit union office is inside the gates of the 
sn1elter. Only employees have free access. Donees sel-
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dom if ever go to the office. Certainly donee makes no 
deposit to the account. 
The donor exclusively controls the account in his 
lifetime, both as to deposits and \Vithdrawals. 
If he wants to eliminate the donee, he simply with-
draws all money on deposit, the donee neither signs for 
vvithdrawal or is notified. 
This gentlemen, is actually ''That happens in the vast 
rnaj.ority of cases. 
Douglas K. Culley, the son, testified to the exact 
nature of his relation to the account. 
Practically every other donee, whether wife, brother, 
sister, or friend, would testify exactly as did Douglas K . 
.. Culley. 
Under this decision, a substantial majority of the 
savings accounts in the Garfield Srneltermen 's Credit 
Union, would be in exactly the sarne position as the 
account in this case. 
I assume this ·Court is not so gullible as to believe 
brotherly love \Vould predominate, over the heirs pos-
sibly getting a cut of the saving account as such heir. 
I think it is a fair conclusion that this ruling will 
result in a substantial increase in probate proceedings, 
follo\\"ed by litigation between the estate, the survivor 
and the credit union, savings and loan association and 
banks. 
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The vie"\\r expressed by Judge Henriod in the Tan-
gren vs. Ingalls case is ahnost prophetic, ''Then he said 
at page 186, ''This case has upsidedo"\\7ned the law on 
joints accounts. 1\{ost certainly it will require banks and 
depositors to change their ways, to what extent it is 
difficult to anticipate. This case will bring more than 
one client into the advocates office to inquire: Why did 
you tell 1ne that our joint account 'vould eliminate the 
necessity of making a vvill, and would save 1ne the costs 
of probate ... " That has already been my experience. 
For thirty years I have urged my people to make 
these joint accounts, in lieu of a will and expense of 
probate. 
Lee Cummings was nice enough to send me extra 
copies of the "green sheet'' in this case, which I for-
'varded to the ·Culley boys and the treasurer of the 
smelter credit union. 
Based on telephone calls, personal contacts, and 
overheard comments, this community is much disturbed. 
To those who have consulted me since the opinion, 
I have no answer that satisfies them or me. 
If 1ny version of the decision, as set out herein, is 
in error, then I would be happy and delighted to he so 
enlightened. 
If my version is correct, then this Court should, if 
it still sustains Judge Ellett, set it out in no uncertain 
terms. 
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In shop.-talk with other attorneys, their conePrn is 
the same as mine herein expressed. 
This Court could render a great service to both 
savings institutions, the legal profession and to deposi-
-. t.ors, by once and for all clearing the confusion hereto-
fore existing as to savings accounts held jointly, and 
particularly clarify this last decision. 
CON·OL USIONS 
1. There is no clear and convincing proof, sufficient 
to set aside and void the joint share agreement. 
2. Absent misconduct on part of donee, his intent 
in setting up the joint account, is not alone, sufficient 
to void joint account. 
3. The question of attempted testamentary disposi-
tion should not be added to matters to be considered in 
determining intent. 
4. Where the evidence is documentary, and no con-
flict in oral testimony, this Court should makes its own 
determination of intent and other issues. 
5. The use of joint accounts, as done in this case, 
to. avoid probate, is a long established business practice; 
and \vhich is supported by legislative enactment. 
6. This decision will be the basis for increased liti-
gation that involve joint savings accounts. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Roy F. Tygesen - Attorney for 
Douglas K. c·ulley (son) Interpleading 
Plaintiff, appellant and petitioner for 
rehearing. 
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